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The Croatian Labor Code was significantly reformed in 2003 as a result of extensive 
negotiations lasting about two years. Proponents of the reform emphasized the 
supposed rigidity of the labor market, resulting from restrictive employment 
protection legislation, as a main rationale for the reform. Critics believed that the 
labor market is much more flexible than often thought due to inadequate enforcement 
of legislation. 
 
This study aims to assess the level of labor market dynamics by constructing 
disaggregated indicators of job and worker flows, according to different types of 
enterprises and workers. Job and worker flows reveal that the overall degree of 
flexibility is not below that observed in other transition countries as employers 
learned to increasingly use flexible contracts. However, the findings confirm a strong 
dualism in the Croatian labor market. While labor market regulation did not 
significantly inhibit flexibility in the new private sector, it seems that regulation may 
have slowed down the process of restructuring and shedding labor in the state and 
newly privatized sectors. Also, as employers in the de novo private sector increasingly 
relied on short-term temporary contracts, it seems that incentives for engaging 
informal labor diminished. Therefore, the reform of regulation is likely to foster 
employment restructuring in state and newly privatized sectors, but cannot be 
expected to facilitate more flexibility in the de novo private sector.Introduction 
 
A debate on the optimal form of labor market legislation developed in Croatia during 
the 2001-2003 period. The source of the debate has been government’s intention to 
reform allegedly rigid labor market regulation and bring it more in line with 
regulation in other transition countries. However, it seems that the degree of labor 
market flexibility has not been properly addressed as protracted discussion brought to 
light remarkably little evidence on the actual level of Croatian labor market 
flexibility. Rare reports came mostly from foreign and international organizations 
backing the reform. The process of reform finally ended during summer 2003 with the 
introduction of the new Labor Code, which significantly eased regulation. This paper 
looks at some indicators brought up in the discussion, seeks to assess the level of 
labor market flexibility in more detail and compares it with available indicators for 
other transition countries. 
 
The process of labor legislation reform in Croatia, the rationale for the reform as well 
as the outcome of the process is outlined in the first part of the paper. The second part 
of the paper examines the concept of labor market flexibility and establishes the link 
between some specific types of flexibility and labor market flows. The third part 
presents disaggregated data on patterns of worker flows and underlying job 
reallocation between different firms. This section also addresses the question of 
whether Croatian labor market really exhibits significantly lower degree of flexibility 
than other transition countries and which segments of the labor market are more 
flexible than the others. Finally, a conclusion on the scope of labor market adjustment 
and possible impact of regulation is made. 
 
 
The Reform of Croatian labor legislation 
 
Croatia has recently conducted a comprehensive reform of its Labor Code. Previous 
amendments to the Labor Code date back to 2001 and 1995, but it was not until 2003 
that the reform process seriously gathered pace. The process of negotiations 
surrounding the most recent reform lasted about two years and finally ended in July 
2003 with the introduction of the new Labor Code. Although both trade unions and employers associations participating in the negotiations process publicly expressed 
their discontent with the final result, no one took serious action to prevent the law 
from coming into force.  
 
The change of the Labor Code was substantial. It transformed Croatia from one of the 
European countries with the most stringent labor market regulation, as measured by 
EPL (Employment protection legislation) index
1, to a country with an EPL index 
close to the EU average. Changes in labor legislation have caused a 23% decrease of 
EPL index, from 3.59 to 2.76. More flexibility was introduced in all three major 
components of the EPL index, permanent employment, temporary employment and 
collective dismissals, yet the introduction of temporary work agencies had the 
strongest influence on overall change of the Croatian EPL index. Early versions of the 
Labor Code reform included changes that would have reduced the EPL index to 2.25, 
below the averages of EU and transition countries, but the negotiation process among 
social partners restricted the scope of reforms in the fields of regular employment and 
fixed-term contracts. Therefore, as a final result of the reform, employment protection 
features in the new Labor Code were not reduced as much as the government initially 
suggested. Croatia still has a bit more heavily regulated labor market than the average 
of EU and transition countries (Biondic and Matkovic, 2003). 
 
The relaxation of the EPL was accompanied by certain government concessions in the 
form of increased level and duration of unemployment benefits. This is not surprising 
since the basic rationale for EPL is to provide insurance against reduction in income 
associated with job loss. Such insurance in an explicit form would be subject to moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems, which makes it impossible to offer insurance 
under reasonable premia. Therefore, governments usually provide EPL and 
unemployment insurance to resolve such problems. In line with this observation, 
available evidence suggests the existence of a trade-off between EPL and the level of 
unemployment insurance among EU member countries. Some offer higher 
unemployment insurance benefits, while others engage in more strict provision of 
                                                                 
1 EPL index measures different procedures, costs, restrictions and periods required for the dismissal of 
employees. It is calculated as a weighted mean of 22 different indicators. Some of these indicators are 
numerically expressed within the law (such as severance pay and notice period), while others are 
qualitative in nature and have to be quantified according to the specified methodology (for detail on the EPL (Young, 2003). This view implies that some countries with high levels of EPL 
might try to substitute decreases in EPL with increases in unemployment insurance 
benefits. The new trade-off between EPL and unemployment benefits may prove to be 
more efficient than the old as it may facilitate labor market adjustment. The profile of 
the reform conducted in Croatia, more or less complies with this pattern since both the 
coverage and total spending on unemployment insurance in Croatia were fairly low 
prior to the reform, while the EPL level was high. Unemployment insurance benefits 
on average amounted to one quarter of the average wage and the share of 




Foreign and international organizations, such as the World Bank
3 and USAID, 
provided much of the intellectual support for introducing more flexibility into the 
labor market during the negotiations process. Although the government presented 
some scattered evidence on the impact of EPL and its reform on the labor market to 
trade unions prior to the beginning of the negotiations, the government did not present 
any coherent document to the public on the reasons to reform the Labor code. 
Therefore, the two reports mentioned above can be considered as the only articulated 
explanations of the necessity of implementing Labor Code reform in Croatia.  
 
The report by USAID (Lowther, 2003) does not assess the degree of flexibility of the 
Croatian labor market and its impact on labor market outcomes, but it rather focuses 
on the general reasons for introducing more flexibility. It focuses on specific social 
benefits arising from a more flexible labor market, such as higher productivity and 
better international competitiveness of domestic firms as well as higher rate of 
economic growth with beneficial effects on employment and wages in the medium 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
calculation of the EPL index see OECD, 1997). Nevertheless, some important limitations of the EPL 
index have to be acknowledged when interpreting the data. 
2 It has to be acknowledged that registered unemployment was 40%-50% higher than survey 
unemployment due to various other benefits such as health insurance, subsidized public transportation, 
subsidized kindergarten and education costs and lower court fees. 
3 In addition to analytical assistance, World Bank included Labor Code reform as one of the 
requirements for the release of the second part of the Structural adjustment loan, amounting to USD 
100 million (and the IMF supported the reform as well by including it as one of the structural 
benchmarks in the stand-by arrangement, but the IMF didn’t trouble the government after it repeatedly 
broke the deadlines for completion of the reform), which gave an additional push to the reform. 
However, trade unions felt it as an attempt to exhort the reform in a specific form and repeatedly asked term. Also, inclusion of marginal groups, such as women with children and older 
workers, into the labor force and better alignment of work and personal interests were 
emphasized in the report. The report also acknowledges that there are costs for 
workers arising from introduction of more flexibility into the labor market in the form 
of higher unemployment risk. In addition, the report considers the roles of interested 
parties in promotion of flexibility and suggests reduction of government regulation 
accompanied by more active involvement of trade unions and employers associations 
in the form of collective bargaining. 
 
The definition of flexibility adopted in the Lowther report has been widely used. The 
report describes flexibility as the ability of a firm and its employees to: 1) adjust the 
level and timing of labor inputs in response to changes in demand, 2) vary wage levels 
according to productivity and/or profitability, and 3) change workers’ tasks in 
response to changes in demand (Lowther, 2003). Flexibility defined in this way has 
four specific forms: time flexibility, flexible (or atypical) employment, flexibility of 
pay and work organization flexibility. However, as it is not an easy task to assess the 
actual level of flexibility according to this definition, since there is no reference to 
measurement of any component of flexibility in the Croatian labor market. 
 
A recent World Bank report (Rutkowski, 2003) provided another piece of expert 
assistance to the Labor Code reform
4. In that report, problems of low employment and 
high unemployment in Croatia are attributed to poor job creation that falls short of job 
destruction. Moreover, Rutkowski (2003) finds evidence that both the job creation 
rate and the job turnover rate in Croatia, which he uses to approximate labor market 
flexibility, are significantly lower than corresponding rates in either other transition 
countries of the Central and Eastern Europe or in the mature market economies. This 
feature of the Croatian labor market was supposedly caused by one of the highest EPL 
levels in Europe (as documented by Biondic, et al, 2002), which is in line with 
theoretical predictions of EPL effects. However, it has to be noted that the definition 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
the government to confirm that it was not acting under pressure from those organizations to introduce 
new provisions into the Labor Code. 
4 The paper by Rutkowski (2003) does not constitute a separate report but it was written as a part of a 
Country economic memorandum by the World Bank, which also includes chapters on other important 
topic such as trade issues, macroeconomic and financial sector issues, reform of the agricultural sector 
etc. of labor market flexibility as a sufficiently high job turnover rate differs from the 
definition of flexibility in the Lowther report. 
 
The connection between a high level of EPL and a low job turnover rate in Croatia is 
largely based on circumstantial evidence and Rutkowski does not explore it in detail. 
The report still asserts that scaling-back of the EPL should facilitate increasing the job 
turnover rate and reducing unemployment. However, the final conclusion of the report 
does not seem entirely warranted. First of all, empirical research does not confirm 
with certainty the theoretical link between EPL and job turnover, as will later be 
elaborated at greater length. Furthermore, even theoretical models of EPL effects 
suggest that a high level of EPL reduces employment variability, but the impact on 
average level of employment is considered to be ambiguous (Young, 2003). This is 
the case because a reduction in the level of EPL has two opposing effects. First, it 
increases the incidence of unemployment. Second, it reduces the average duration of 
unemployment as it increases the outflow from unemployment into employment. 
Therefore, reduction of EPL level leads to a fall in unemployment only if the second 
effect prevails (OECD, 1997). Nevertheless, an increase in job creation and turnover, 
regardless of whether it reduces the level of unemployment, may seem a worthwhile 
reform goal. I deal with this in more detail in the next section. 
 
The main criticisms of the reform rested on the argument that the law was poorly 
implemented in practice and therefore diagnoses of labor market impacts were 
misguided. Trade unions opposed the change because, in their view, employers did 
not always adhere to the letter of the law as they managed to avoid enforcement. Of 
course, this is not a firm counter-argument to the reform, as an overarching regulation 
may be a major motivation to employ workers informally, but it suggests that there 
may be more forces at work and that the Croatian labor market could prove to be 
more flexible than expected. 
 
 Flexibility and labor market flows 
 
According to Monastiriotis (2003), labor market flexibility refers to the extent to 
which labor market forces determine labor market outcomes, or the absence of any 
factors entering the labor market other than supply and demand. This approach looks 
at flexibility as an outcome, which can be measured, rather than some unrealized 
potential. However, labor market flexibility is neither uniform nor homogeneous. In 
line with this notion as well as the discussion above of the studies assessing the 
flexibility of the Croatian labor market, labor market flexibility can be decomposed in 
different ways. One logical ways is along two axes: numerical versus functional and 
internal versus external flexibility. This decomposition gives four different types of 
flexibility: internal numerical flexibility (adjustability of labor inputs already 
employed by the firm – working hours, working time, leave and holidays), external 
numerical flexibility (adjustability of labor intake from the external labor market), 
internal functional flexibility (ability to improve efficiency by reorganizing the 
methods of production and labor content) and finally external functional flexibility 
(ability to externalize or diversify parts of production through sub-contracting). These 
categories overlap to some extent with the approach employed by Lowther as well as 
with the indicators Rutkowski used. Monastiriotis prefers to take a somewhat wider 
perspective encompassing three different broad domains of flexibility: production 
function flexibility, labor costs flexibility and supply side flexibility, which further 
collapse into smaller sub-domains. 
 
Table 1 Types of labor market flexibility 
Labor market flexibility 
Production-
function 
Labor-Costs  Supply - side 























Source: Monastiriotis (2003) 
 
There are many possible impediments to flexibility, defined in this manner. EPL and 
other regulations are not the only forces shaping labor market flexibility, but they are prominent in practice. Also, regulations are more likely to affect particular 
dimensions of flexibility, such as numerical flexibility or flexibility in labor input and 
labor mobility. Therefore, it is possible for the labor market to retain a certain level of 
flexibility regardless of increased regulation due to compensating movements in other 
areas and conversely, more flexible regulation may not to result in the expected 
increases in overall flexibility. For example, Abraham and Houseman (1993) find that 
adjustment of the employment level to a fall in demand is much slower in Belgium 
and Germany than in the United States, but adjustment in the hours of work is similar, 
which means that internal flexibility almost fully compensates for the lack of external 
flexibility. However, it is also possible that different restrictions sometimes reinforce 
each other. For instance, stricter firing regulation is likely to increase insider power of 
employees and hence reduce wage flexibility (Rutkowski, 2003). 
 
Two reports backing the reform of the Croatian Labor Code argue decisively that 
reform is necessary in order to enhance labor market flexibility. However, as can be 
seen from the discussion above, there is no agreement on the proper way to define 
labor market flexibility, let alone to measure it. Moreover, although some of the 
effects arising from relaxation of EPL have been touched upon in both reports, the 
discussion from the literature on the overall balance has not been adequately covered. 
There are some potential benefits of EPL that have to be taken into the account when 
considering its impact on labor market. The first is the reduction of uninsurable risk, 
which is the standard reason for the introduction and support of the EPL. In addition 
to this, EPL may encourage human capital investment by making the relationship 
between employer and employee more secure. This should have beneficial effects on 
productivity. EPL also internalizes part of the social costs arising from worker 
dismissals (OECD, 1999). 
 
On the other side, as was properly addressed in the report by Rutkowski (2003), rigid 
labor market regulation is often blamed for increasing unemployment and decreasing 
employment in transition countries as well as in Western European countries that have 
enacted such regulation. However, some authors have taken position that increasing 
unemployment is not the most costly feature of EPL. Aghion and Howitt (1994) 
suggest a relationship between job creation, job destruction, and productivity growth. 
They model a process of creative destruction in which job turnover leads to labor productivity increases. The logic of their theoretical model suggests that firms 
engaging in restructuring destroy low productivity jobs and create high productivity 
ones. Therefore, a positive correlation between productivity growth and job turnover, 
facilitated by low level of EPL, might be expected.  
 
To the extent that productivity growth results from the entry of new firms and the 
experimentation they introduce, the most harmful effect of EPL may not be on job 
turnover between existing firms, but rather on entry and exit of firms. Scarpetta, 
Hemmings, Tressel and Jaejoon (2002) report that shifts in market shares of operating 
firms influence productivity only modestly, while entry and exit of firms can account 
for 20% to 40% of total productivity growth. Their empirical analysis confirms that 
EPL has a strong effect on market access of small and medium-sized firms, which 
indirectly affects productivity growth. Although there are no similar studies 
performed in transition countries, intuition would suggest that both of these effects 
would be particularly harmful in a transition economy needing rapid reallocation of 
jobs and workers away from the old, inefficient sectors. 
 
A high degree of job reallocation may also have some negative effects, at least in the 
short run, in terms of worker displacement and earnings losses, but the aggregate and 
long-run benefits are likely to compensate the individual costs (Faggio and Konings, 
2003). Having all this in mind, there are several good reasons to focus on labor 
market flows or external numerical flexibility in order to assess the impact of EPL on 
labor market flexibility
5. First of all, given the theoretical background, the assumption 
that job and worker flows may capture the impact of labor market regulations such as 
EPL on labor market adjustment seems acceptable. Theoretical models are mostly 
concerned with the impact of EPL on job flows, but it is clear that job turnover also 
affects worker turnover. Although there are supply-side reasons, such as job-
shopping, human capital acquisition, career progression and events that affect 
preferences regarding work (like children), it is a consensus now that there is a major 
role for demand-side disturbances in explaining worker mobility (Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1999). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that all regulations affecting 
                                                                 
5 Thorough definitions of labor market flows are provided in Annex 1. firms’ decisions to employ or dismiss workers have a decisive impact on both job and 
worker flows. 
 
Furthermore, job and worker flows are already widely used to evaluate the 
functioning of the labor market, which generates some comparative empirical 
evidence. Faggio and Konings (1998) emphasize that job flows reflect the processes 
of reallocation and restructuring underlying the reform in transition countries, at least 
for the initial restructuring that followed the imposition of hard budget constraint and 
start of labor shedding. Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) consider a labor market to 
be flexible when it is characterized by the simultaneous presence of contracting and 
expanding firms. Faggio and Konnings (2003) adopt this definition and supplement it 
with a notion that in a flexible labor market, workers can move and jobs can be easily 
created/destroyed in order to meet new economic conditions. Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1999) stress that the extent to which labor reallocation and matching process operates 
smoothly measures the difference between successful and unsuccessful 
macroeconomic performance. Bertola, Boeri and Cazes (1999) as well as Cazes and 
Nesporova (2003) emphasize the magnitude of hirings and firings, or worker flows as 
a means of capturing the impact of regulation on labor market adjustment. 
 
Unlike those studies, Monastiriotis (2003) considers the extent of alternative types of 
employment, such as home work, part-time and temporary work, to capture external 
numerical flexibility, which is related to EPL. However, while confining worker 
mobility and tenure indicators to the supply-side flexibility sub-index, he 
acknowledges that there is significant overlap between different types of flexibility 
and certain indicators do not correspond directly and exclusively to one group only. 
Although it may be difficult to distinguish between worker and job mobility driven by 
labor supply and labor demand and therefore hard to judge how to represent each of 
the flexibility dimensions, this paper supports the more conventional view that labor 
demand is guiding the process of worker and job reallocation and therefore employs 
those indicators to assess the impact of labor market regulation. 
 
There are also a few disadvantages associated with the use of worker and job flows to 
approximate labor market flexibility. First of all, these indicators are not readily 
available and they are usually the products of comprehensive research, such as that of Rutkowski (2003). Furthermore, research methodologies conducted for different 
countries usually differ, as one study uses firm level data, while others also capture 
within-firm flows that arise between different establishments. There are also some 
studies that seek to capture flows within establishments, which are the hardest to 
measure, but give the most accurate measure of flows (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999). 
Even if there is the same basic unit of observation, definitions of firms and 
establishments do not necessarily coincide between different countries and periods. It 
is also hard to adequately capture organizational changes and change of ownership 
over time. Finally, definitions of jobs, sampling intervals and sectoral coverage differ 




Labor market adjustment in international perspective 
 
The most comprehensive work undertaken so far on the impact of EPL on labor 
market adjustment are the OECD (1997) and OECD (1999) studies conducted for 
members of that organization. The first study finds job turnover rates to be high 
across all member states, well in excess of net job creation rates. Also, the flows 
appear to be remarkably stable for most OECD member countries during the late 
1970’s – early 1990’s period, even for those that significantly liberalized their labor 
market regulation at that time, although there is some variation along the business 
cycle. The most interesting finding appears to be on the relationship between EPL and 
job turnover, which is statistically insignificant, while the link between the EPL 
governing temporary workers and job turnover is somewhat stronger. If there is any 
relationship between the EPL and turnover, it looks as if a high level of EPL dampens 
only the cyclical fluctuations of job turnover rates. Also, restrictive EPL may transfer 
some of the turnover from permanent to temporary workers and from large to small 
companies, which are less likely to be affected by the regulation. The subsequent 
study (OECD, 1999) included different measures of labor market dynamics and found 
some evidence of stricter EPL having somewhat stronger effects on worker turnover 
than job turnover as it decreases churning of workers between different jobs. This 
effect is also visible in higher mean job tenure in countries with stricter EPL. 
 The average EPL level in Central and Eastern European transition countries does not 
differ much from the EU average. There are large differences between these countries 
as well, reflecting the fact that many of them shaped their labor market regulation 
according to legislation in neighboring EU countries (e.g. EPL features in Estonia are 
similar to Sweden, while Slovenian EPL reflects Italian influences; Riboud et al., 
2001). This means that transition countries on average have a fairly restrictive labor 
market regulation and there is also ample variation amongst them, allowing the effects 
of those differences to be explored. 
 
Table 2 EPL index in transition countries 
EPL components    EPL 






Bulgaria  2.5  1.9  3.4  1.8 
Croatia (before 2003 reform)  3.6  2.8  3.9  5.0 
Croatia (after 2003 reform)  2.7  2.6  2.6  3.5 
Croatia – gov’t proposal  2.3  2.4  1.6  3.5 
Czech Republic  2.1  2.8  0.5  4.3 
Estonia  2.6  3.1  1.4  4.1 
Hungary  1.7  2.1  0.6  3.4 
Poland  2.0  2.2  1.0  3.9 
Romania  2.8  1.7  3.0  4.8 
Slovak Republic  2.4  2.6  1.4  4.4 
Slovenia  3.5  3.4  2.4  4.8 
Average (Croatia excl.)  2.5  2.5  1.7  3.9 
EU average  2.4  2.4  2.1  3.2 
Sources: Rutkowski (2003), Biondic and Matkovic (2003) and Micevska (2003) 
 
Comparative studies of labor market flows in transition countries are particularly 
scarce, while there are a few more utilizing case-study approaches. Important 
comparative studies on labor market adjustment in transition countries include recent 
papers by Faggio and Konings (2003) as well as Cazes and Nesporova (2003). Faggio 
and Konings (2003) examine job flows in five transition countries. Their study 
concludes that in countries with more rapid reform, job creation catches-up faster with 
job destruction. Moreover, the study finds Estonia to be the most dynamic among the 
transition countries, as job turnover rates in Estonia resemble the behavior of more 
dynamic market economies, such as the US or UK. Other transition countries included 
in the study, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Slovenia, are more similar to regulated 
labor markets of Western European countries. What is particularly striking about 
these job flows is that the volumes involved are not exceptional, as one might expect from the transition process requiring a massive reallocation of resources. However, 
this finding might be biased because flow data are extracted from the AMADEUS 
enterprise database comprising data for medium and large enterprises, while small 
enterprises, which usually account for a substantial part of the overall job turnover, 
are not included in the database. 
 
Table 3 Job flows in transition countries  (Faggio-Konings dataset) 
  Job creation  Job turnover  Excess job 
reallocation 
Bulgaria 1994-1997  5.7  8.1 4.8 
Estonia 1994-1997  8.1  16 13.5 
Poland 1994-1997  5.4  8.5 6.3 
Romania 1994-1997  9.0  13.0 8.0 
Slovenia 1995-1997  5.2  9.6 8.6 
Source: Faggio and Konings (2003) 
 
If EPL indices for transition countries and data on job flows reported by Faggio and 
Konings (2003) are observed together, there seems to be no apparent relationship, 
which is similar to previous findings for OECD member countries. Since EPL data 
cover late 1990’s period, there is a possibility that reform of the labor market 
regulation in some of those countries changed the EPL level somewhat compared to 
the mid 1990’s period, to which jobs flow data refer. But it is unlikely that their 
relative rankings changed much. Also, it remains an open question to what extent 
enterprises in the sample used for the calculation of job flows are representative of the 
entire enterprise population in those countries. 































Sources: same as for tables 2&3 
 
Cazes and Nesporova (2003), using a bivariate approach, find some connection 
between EPL index, especially the difficulty of dismissal sub-index, and worker 
turnover in six transition countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Russia 
and Slovenia). However, the link is very weak as it appears that the impact of other 
factors, such as macroeconomic and structural reforms, passive and active labor 
market policies, remains important. Also, their results seem to heavily depend on 
Slovenia, which has a considerably higher EPL level than other countries in the 
sample and somewhat lower worker turnover than the average. 
 
Papers employing case-study approach provided some similar conclusions to these 
two studies. Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2000) also deem Estonia to be a success 
story due to aggressive pursuit of decentralized wage setting and labor market reform. 
They contrast their findings with Slovenia, which pursued a more gradual labor 
market reform, provided more income support and implemented a higher level of 
EPL. Policies implemented in Slovenia increased the costs of separation for Slovenian 
firms, which resulted in a lower level of job flows, with the highest job creation rate 
in Slovenia during the early 1990’s barely surpassing half of the observed maximum 
rate in Estonia. Jurajda and Terrel (2001) contrast Czech and Estonian transition experiences, where Estonia represents a benchmark for rapid transition with high job 
turnover rates, while the Czech labor market exhibits lower job turnover rates during 
the early transition, which is symptomatic of a Czech gradualist approach to 
transition. Therefore, it seems that most comparative insights into the dynamics of job 
flows in transition countries rest on a few case studies finding contrasts between 
Estonia and other transition countries with less flexible labor markets, such as 
Slovenia, Poland or Czech Republic. 
 
Table 4 Job flows in transition countries (Rutkowski dataset) 






Bulgaria 2000  6.8  17.6  13.5 
Croatia 2001  3.5  8.4  7.0 
Lithuania 1998-1999  9.7  20.4  19.4 
Poland 1998-1999  5.3  15.4  10.5 
Sources: Rutkowski (2003) 
 
  
Labor market adjustment in Croatia 
 
In his study of the Croatian labor market dynamics, Rutkowski (2003) especially 
emphasizes data on job flows and tenure structure. With a high EPL index and low 
job turnover rates reported by Rutkowski, the Croatian labor market most closely 
resembled the Slovenian case as an archetypal low-flexibility economy. This part of 
the paper will replicate job flow indicators and will also look at worker flow data as 
well as their particular characteristics, since the motivation for using these indicators 
in studies of labor market adjustment has already been extensively elaborated. 
 
Job turnover rates in Croatia during the 1994-2001 period calculated using enterprise 
annual reports fluctuated around 16%, which is in the middle of the 10%-20% range 
of job turnover observed in most market economies (OECD, 1999). This job turnover 
rate is approximately double Rutkowski’s (2003) indicator for 2001. Such a large 
difference between those two sets of job flow indicators could arise from two possible 
sources. The first is the sampling procedure used by Rutkowski. This study, in contrast, encompasses the whole population of reporting enterprises
6. As job turnover 
rates exhibited by different enterprises differ wildly, any bias towards government 
owned and large enterprises would severely reduce job turnover. The second reason 
for possible differences is the data cleaning procedure, which eliminated some job 
turnover arising from errors in the data
7. Details on data sources and cleaning 
procedure used in this study are reported in annex 2. 
 












1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
GDP change Employment change
Job creation Job destruction
Net job creation  
Source: Croatian Bureau of Statistics; authors calculations based on FINA database 
 
The stagnation of the job turnover rate in Croatia during the 1994-2001 period 
resulted from falling job destruction rates and increasing job creation, which finally 
caught up with job destruction in 2001, as shown in figure 2. Such a pattern is typical 
for a transition economy, but the variation of those rates over the observed period is 
nevertheless small and convergence between job creation and job destruction took 
place late. This indicates that the adjustment process has been subdued, although the 
                                                                 
6 Rutkowski drew a random sample of 12 thousands firms out of the full population, representing about 
a quarter of population. The sample was constructed to ensure representation of firms by ownership 
and region. However, it seems that sample enterprises differ from the population with respect to some 
of their properties. For instance, while enterprises with up to 50 employees account for less than 14% 
of total employment in Rutkowski's sample, they comprise one third of total employment in entire 
population of enterprises. Similarly, enterprises with more than 500 employees make up almost half of 
the total employment in the sample, while their share in the population is approximately one third. 
7 Sample bias alone does not explain different result because job turnover measures within certain size 
classes according to the whole population are somewhat higher than the sample-based turnover 
measures. magnitude of the flows itself does not suggest so. Job turnover exhibits weak overall 
pro-cyclical properties, which grows somewhat stronger when job turnover is 
regressed on lagged GDP growth. Such behavior is untypical for market economies, 
where more variable counter-cyclical job destruction dominates over pro-cyclical job 
creation (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999). The likely reason for low correlation 
between GDP and job flows is the disconnection of employment dynamics from GDP 
dynamics during most of the period under observation. The adjustment of the 
employment level to the transition shock in Croatia was, therefore, a prolonged 
process that lasted until 2001, regardless of the high level of overall job turnover and 
high excess job reallocation. Reported net job flows seem plausible when compared to 
the change in the overall employment. The correlation coefficient between the two is 
0.42, and both of them turn positive in 2001. This means that employment in start-ups 
and outside the enterprise sector plays some role in explaining overall employment 
dynamics, but it does not cancel out the observed job flows in reporting continuing 
enterprises. 
 
Table 5 Correlation coefficients of job flows with GDP and employment changes 




Job creation  0.38  -0.20  -0.18  0.06 
Job destruction  0.35  0.37  -0.34  -0.59 
Job turnover  0.62  0.15  -0.44  -0.46 
Source: Croatian Bureau of Statistics; authors calculations based on FINA database 
 
As net job creation rates were fairly small, excess job reallocation remained important 
during the whole period. Deeper insight into the forces driving excess job reallocation 
can be inferred from data on job flows and excess job reallocation, decomposed 
according to various enterprise characteristics, such as size, ownership, sector of 
economic activity and regional affiliation. Excess job reallocation can be decomposed 
in two components: the portion of such flows arising within a certain group of 
enterprises (such as enterprises operating within a certain economic activity) and 
flows arising between groups of enterprises. The first component is measured at the 
sectoral level as the sum across sectors of excess job reallocation in each sector. The 
second component is measured by summing across sectors the deviation of the absolute value of the growth rate for that sector from the absolute value of the growth 
rate at the sectoral level (Faggio and Konings, 1998). 
 
Decomposed data on job flows (Annex 3) raise a number of important points. First of 
all, there is a stark difference between job creation rates in de novo private enterprises 
and all other enterprises, including mixed ownership, majority private as well as fully 
privatized enterprises. Job creation rates in the former exceed rates in latter by a high 
multiple. At the same time, job destruction rates did not differ that much between 
different types of enterprises, although job destruction rates in de novo private 
enterprises were somewhat higher than the average throughout the entire period. 
Those enterprises on average accounted for almost three-quarters of the total job 
creation during the period under observation, while their share in total job destruction 
was about one-third. Such dynamics of job flows increased their share in total 
employment threefold during the period under observation as they reached 40% of 
employment in reporting enterprises by 2001. 
 
As almost one third of excess job reallocation throughout the entire period took place 
between enterprises belonging to different ownership types, mostly between de novo 
private enterprises and all other enterprises, difference in ownership was the most 
important factor driving reallocation of jobs during the transition process in Croatia. 
However, attrition of jobs in the government sector was nevertheless slow during the 
whole observed period, although the process gained a new momentum in 2001. The 
decline of total employment was spread over a long period of time due to slow 
employment adjustment in state owned and privatized enterprises. 
 
Table 6: Decomposition of excess job reallocation arising from shifts within and 
between different regions, ownership types, size classes and economic activities 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Within regions  98.5  99.7  95.7  98.5  94.0  99.8  92.6  94.0 
Between regions  1.5  0.3  4.3  1.5  6.0  0.2  7.4  6.0 
CV (turnover)  0.22  0.23  0.20  0.25  0.21  0.21  0.20  0.17 
                 
Within the same ownership type  51.5  62.1  61.3  63.1  68.8  85.7  80.9  71.1 
Between different ownership types  48.5  37.9  38.7  36.9  31.2  14.3  19.1  28.9 
CV (turnover)  0.74  0.65  0.58  0.43  0.49  0.47  0.55  0.50 
                 
Within the same size class  79.5  82.8  83.4  83.6  82.8  92.8  94.0  92.3 
Between different size classes  20.5  17.2  16.6  16.4  17.2  7.2  6.0  7.7 
CV (turnover)  0.61  0.55       0.51  0,41  0.48  0.50  0.45  0.39                  
Within sectors      82.6  79.3  79.2  86.6  77.8  81.8 
Between sectors      17.4  20.7  20.8  13.4  22.2  18.2 
CV (turnover)      0.62  1.30  0.61  1.14  1.42  0.75 
Source: authors calculations based on FINA database 
Note: CV – coefficient of variation of disaggregated job turnover 
 
Other enterprise attributes are not as important for explaining the dynamics of job 
reallocation. Most excess job reallocation occurred within economic activities 
(defined at NACE-2 level), with less than 20% of total excess reallocation going on 
between different sectors. Faggio and Konings (1998) report similar results for 
Romania, while inter-sectoral reallocation accounted for only 10% of total excess job 
reallocation in Bulgaria and as much as half of excess reallocation in Estonia. 
Although regional imbalances in Croatia are sometimes alleged to be particularly 
large, according to the regional decomposition of excess job reallocation, this kind of 
mobility appears low, with an average of 3.5% of jobs reallocating between the 
regions. However, this indicator has to be looked at cautiously since employment is 
registered by enterprise headquarters and not by actual location where the work takes 
place, which may bias the indicator either way. Finally, net job creation rates in small 
enterprises during the early years seem dramatic, but as the share of firms with less 
than 20 employees approached a quarter of total employment by the end of the period, 
their growth stalled and the reallocation of jobs between firms of different sizes did 
not appear to be particularly important. The thresholds for firm size classes were 
chosen somewhat arbitrarily, but the choice of six relevant groups would probably 
capture any more significant movements of jobs between enterprises of different size. 
 
The aggregate magnitude of job flows that can be considered normal for most 
countries masks a high degree of segmentation in the Croatian labor market. While 
state owned enterprises as well as privatized enterprises, still accounting for a major 
portion of overall employment, remain stagnant throughout the period, the new 
private sector was exceptionally dynamic. Part of the difference could probably be 
attributed to the fact that small enterprises (with less than 10 employees) were treated 
favorably by the Employment Law, with less cumbersome legal firing procedures, 
which facilitated job reallocation into de novo enterprises. De novo enterprises also 
did not have to bear disproportionate costs of separation for workers with long tenures that burdened state owned and privatized enterprises. However, due to the sheer 
volume of job flows, EPL does not seem to seriously affect employment adjustment in 
de novo enterprises. Stringent regulation perhaps even additionally strained the 
adjustment in de novo enterprises as other enterprises did not seem to perform 
substantial adjustment. 
 
The results reported confirming a considerable degree of overall flexibility as well as 
exceptional dynamics among some enterprises simultaneous with a high EPL level are 
not unique to Croatia. There are other studies of transition countries that are equally 
inconclusive on the empirical validity of the theoretical relationship between EPL and 
job flows in transition countries. Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) conclude that there is 
really not that much variation among countries as roughly one job in ten is created 
and destroyed every year in most advanced economies and transition countries, 
regardless of labor market regulation. These authors base their observations in part on 
the weak comparability of job flow data across countries due to sample and firm 
differences. According to Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), careful disaggregated 
analysis, performed to some extent in this study of the Croatian labor market, is 
essential in order to identify the effects of labor market institutions and policies on 
labor market flows. 
 
Similar to the finding of a fairly high level of job creation in Croatia reported in this 
paper, Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003), using matched employer-employee data, 
find evidence for Slovenia, another country with a high EPL level, of job turnover 
rates approaching 20% during the 1997-1999 period. These turnover rates, which are 
even a bit higher than the rates found in Croatia but in line with figures observed in 
most dynamic transition countries, challenge their older work. There are several 
possible explanations for empirical findings contrasting theoretical predictions on 
EPL effects, going beyond problems in measurement of job flows. 
 
The first reason is that the EPL index, as the most comprehensive indicator available, 
is far from perfect in capturing all the regulatory restrictions on hiring and firing. 
Even Estonia, considered to be the prime example of flexible labor market, has a 
higher value of its EPL index than Czech Republic or Poland, whose labor markets 
are regarded as more rigid. Macculloch and Di Tella (2002) for that reason in their study of labor market rigidities rely on an alternative source--survey based data on 
hiring and firing restrictions from the World Competitiveness Report.  
 
Monastiriotis (2003) and Bertola, Boeri and Cazes (2000) also emphasize 
insufficiencies in the measurement of labor market regulation. Bertola, Boeri and 
Cazes (2000) take the position that EPL index, as well as other available protection 
indicators, are based on unsatisfactory information and capture neither the increasing 
complexity of legal provisions nor their interactions, such as the rise of temporary 
work. The validity of the EPL index became especially problematic after the reform 
process gathered pace during the 1980’s and 1990’s, since this diminished 
correlations between different components of EPL. The authors conclude that there is 
no simple means of calculating the relevant indicators and rankings and that there is a 
need to pursuit further research on that subject. Also, it seems that enforcement of 
regulation matters very much since available evidence points to differences in the 
frequency of labor disputes and national practices in interpretation and resolving 
cases. In light of the ambiguous empirical evidence and the measurement issues, the 
authors believe that policy recommendations should be formulated with caution. 
 
Furthermore, there are many labor market institutions at work beyond the EPL. Cazes 
and Nesporova (2003) point out that labor market adjustment in transition countries 
was significantly affected by macroeconomic and structural reforms. Also the role of 
other labor market institutions, such as passive and active labor market policies, the 
power of trade unions or the tax burden on labor have to be considered. The failure to 
adequately account for all such factors may give rise to flawed conjectures on the 
impact of EPL. 
 
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003) offer an alternative view on the relevant labor 
market institutions influencing job flows. Their study does not assess dynamics of the 
Slovenian labor market in a comparative perspective, but detailed analysis of the 
flows gives some clues as to the forces behind them. Findings concerning the 
determinants of flows at the firm level show that enterprises with higher wage 
dispersion exhibit lower job turnover rates. Therefore, although the study does not 
extend the conclusion too far, high turnover rates may be the consequence of 
compressed wage structures throughout the economy. This possibility is in line with the theoretical model of Bertola and Rogerson (1996) that emphasizes the possible 
role of wage setting institutions on job flows as higher job flows offset for lack of 
wage flexibility. 
 
The route taken in this paper suggests that EPL may affect some workers and 
enterprises, but that their impact on aggregate flexibility becomes less important as 
employers learn to cope with the burden of regulation. However, the impact of EPL is 
not negligible, as it moves turnover from enterprises of one type to enterprises of 
other type. Therefore, it affects the distribution of turnover across enterprises more 
than turnover volume. 
 
The second line of reasoning Rutkowski (2003) used in order to confirm low level of 
flexibility in Croatian labor market was to compare data on tenures. As was 
previously showed, some studies using worker flows and tenure data were more 
successful in finding the impact of EPL on labor market dynamics. Data on average 
tenures and worker flows may also give more precise information on types of workers 
that managed to keep their jobs due to EPL and workers that do not seem so well 
protected by EPL. Indeed, average and median tenures in Croatia, according to the 
labor force survey data, are together with Slovenian and Polish figures (later based on 
Cazes and Nesporova, 2003) among the highest in the group of transition countries. 
 
Table 7 Distribution of tenures in transition countries 
































Nesporova and Cazes (2001) - 
data for 1999 
               
Czech R.  14.6  18.4*  15.3**  26.2  12.3  13.2  8.2   
Estonia  18.4  6.7  31.1  23.9  10.8  9.1  6.9   
Hungary  12.6  11.3  20.0  25.3  17.9  13.0  8.8   
Lithuania  12.8  9.2  29.0  24.8  14.5  9.6  7.6   
Poland  10.5  10.4  14.0  20.8  22.3  22.0  11.9   
Slovenia  12.0  5.1  18.2  16.5  23.6  24.6  12.0   
Rutkowski (2003)                 
Bulgaria (2001)  14.0  9.5  25.2  20.8  19.8  10.8  8.1  5.5 
Czech R. (1995)  19.2  36.6  12.0  14.8  17.4  9.0  2.0 
Lithuania (2001)  15.4  8.9  21.6  25.4  16.8  11.9  8.3  5.0 
Poland (1999)  14.5  11.7  19.0  17.7  20.3  16.7  9.6  6.2 
Croatia (2001)  9.7  5.1  17.2  21.3  20.7  26.0  12.2  8.0 
own calculation                 Croatia (2002)  13.4  6.3  16.7  21.1  19.2  23.3  11.8  7.9 
Source: Rutkowski (2003), Nesporova and Cazes (2001) and own calculations based 
on Labor Force Survey, 1
st half of 2002 
Note: * refers to 1-3 years; ** refers to 3-5 years 
 
Reliance on tenure and worker flow data rather than job flows also has some 
deficiencies. First of all, there are different sources of worker flow data yielding 
different results, such as enterprise surveys and labor force surveys, conducted with 
different frequencies. Second, participation rates of different age groups may affect 
tenure structure, with low participation rate of young persons increasing the share of 
persons with longer tenures and hence raising the average tenure
8. Furthermore, 
tenure structures do not account for the dynamics of overall employment, which may 
also interact with age-specific participation rates. Employment reductions usually 
affect workers with shorter tenures as the seniority principle often prevails in case of 
redundancies, which increases average tenure throughout the economy. At the same 
time, larger number of newly employed persons, facilitated by employment growth, 
reduces average tenure. A final and more substantial problem with this approach is 
that EPL may have some effect on job stability only for employees with tenures 
exceeding a certain threshold, while average tenure may disregard churning that takes 
place amongst the most dynamic group of employees with the shortest tenures. 
 
Table 8 Hiring rates, separation rates and worker turnover in transition 
countries 
  Hiring rates  Separation rates  Worker turnover rate 
Bulgaria (1999 -ES)  27.6  39.9  67.5 
Estonia (1998-LFS)  16.0  19.0  35.0 
Czech Republic (1998-LFS)  10.5  11.8  22.3 
Poland (1998-ES)  24.6  22.8  47.4 
Poland (1998-LFS)  21.2  17.0  38.2 
Slovenia (2001-ES)  15.6  14.5  30.1 
Croatia (2002-LFS-annual)  13.4  16.3  29.7 
Croatia (2002-LFS-quarterly)  26.3  26.2  52.5 
Source: Cazes and Nesporova (2001) and own calculations based on Labor Force 
Survey 2002 
 
Notwithstanding the problems elaborated so far, how do worker flows in Croatia 
compare to other countries? The hiring rate in Croatia, calculated on an annual basis from the LFS database, was 13.4% in 2002, while the worker turnover rate was 
29.7%, which falls in the middle of the range observed in selected transition countries, 
close to the Estonian and Slovenian figures
9. Higher rates compared to results 
Rutkowski (2003) reported probably stem from the employment growth taking place 
in 2002
10, on the one hand, and from the growing proportion of temporary workers 
among the newly employed, on the other hand
11. This illustrates the importance of 
different effects other than EPL on worker flows, such as cyclical dynamics of 
employment and employers learning about new ways to facilitate flexible 
arrangements. Moreover, if worker flows are constructed on a quarterly basis, the 
resulting figures are almost twice as high, revealing the short average duration of 
many recent temporary contracts. Temporary workers accounted for 12.5% of total 
employment in 2002 and only 15% of those had contract duration above 1 year 
(Crnkovic-Pozaic, 2004)
12. With significant churning taking place on the low end of 
the tenure structure, the comparatively high average tenure in Croatia resulted from 
the gap in the middle of the tenure structure and many workers with long tenures.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
8 Low participation rate of young persons may itself be a consequence of labor market rigidities. 
9 The hiring rate calculated on an annual basis falls short of the separation rate despite employment 
growth because it is underestimated to a greater extent as some workers entering employment churn 
between jobs within the same year (all worker flows including multiple switches within a year under 
observation are not captured in this framework). The bias is significantly reduced in the quarterly 
figures. 
10 Employment rate of persons older than 15 years increased from 41.8% in 2001 to 43.3% in 2002. 
11 According to the data from Croatian employment service, in 2002 between 80% and 90% of the 
newly employed had temporary contracts, up from 50% to 60% in 1995. 
12 Contact expiration does not necessarily lead to separation, but temporary contracts can be renewed 
only a limited number of times as total cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts (accounting for 
almost four-fifths of all temporary contracts) could not exceed 2 years (this period was increased to 3 
years after the 2003 changes of the Labor Code), while there were similar limitations to seasonal and 






































Source: tables 2 and 8 
 
Disaggregated worker flow data according to ownership again reveal high turnover in 
the private sector, both on the hiring and separation sides, while turnover among the 
government employees and employees in state owned enterprises is less than half of 
that figure. Average tenures show the opposite picture, with average tenure in 
government and state owned sector of about 14 years, which is almost double as much 
as in the private sector. Unfortunately, the structure of the LFS does not allow us to 
distinguish between privatized enterprises and de novo private enterprises, which 
exhibit much higher job turnover rates. Therefore, the average for the largest 
employment category conceals some of the differences that job flow data indicate. It 
is also interesting to note that self-employment is the major employment category 
with the highest average tenure. This is obviously a heterogeneous category, but the 
average tenure of persons belonging to the self-employed category would suggest that 
they, on average, do not comprise a flexible group compensating for the lack of 
flexibility among employees in other sectors, as is sometimes thought about self-
employed. It to some extent also reflects the impact of individuals engaged in 
agriculture, who often do not retire after the mandatory age. If the self-employed are 
excluded from the calculation, the average tenure for all other categories of employment (comprising almost 83% of total employment) is 8.9 years, which is 
similar to transition countries with more flexible labor markets. 
 













workers  On contract 
Hiring rate  6.9  6.5  22.1  6.4  9.1  39.5 
Separation rate  10.4  11.7  21.3  19.4  23.2  29.5 
of which: job to job  4.8  2.9  9.3  2.2  3.2  7.4 
Total worker 
turnover rate 
17.3  18.1  43.4  25.8  32.3  68.9 
Employment share  17.2  35.1  37.9  2.5  5.0  2.4 
Average tenure  14.9  14.3  7.8  16.3  16.8  4.2 
Source: own calculations based on Labor Force Survey 2002 
 
Worker turnover rates steadily decrease with age, reflecting both decreasing hiring 
and separation rates. Only the oldest category represents an exception with respect to 
the separation side, which shows an impact of retirement and persons leaving the 
labor force. It is particularly interesting to note that although young persons represent 
a category with exceptionally high unemployment, their turnover rates are 
tremendous. Although it seems that young persons find a job with ease, it is very hard 
for them to keep the job or transfer directly into another job as they face considerable 
job insecurity. Young persons, therefore, find it difficult to cross over the one year 
tenure threshold, which leads to the gap in the middle of the tenure structure. Older 
persons participating in the employment face a substantially lower possibility of 
separation than young persons, but chances of finding a new job decrease even more 
with age. Persons in each reported age-group on average have about five years longer 
tenure, except for the last category, reflecting again the impact of self-employed 
agriculture workers. 
 
Table 10 Hirings and separation rates, according to age groups 
  15-24  25-34  35-44  45-54  55- 
Hirings  44.9  18.9  9.0  5.0  2.2 
Total separations  28.6  17.8  11.4  10.4  22.8 
of which: job-to-
job 
9.7  9.4  5.2  2.9  0.7 
Total worker 
turnover rate  73.5  36.7  20.4  15.3  25.0 
Employment 
share  9.0  23.2  29.9  26.8  11.0 Average tenure  1.8  5.2  10.8  16.7  26.2 
Source: own calculations based on Labor Force Survey 2002 
 
Since one possible reaction of employers to high level of EPL (or hiring and firing 
restrictions) and high non-wage labor costs is to seek informality, it is interesting to 
ask to what extent employers use informal employment in order to facilitate 
flexibility. It is notoriously hard to estimate informal employment, although some 
attempts have been made. Crnkovic-Pozaic (1997), using the Labor force survey, 
estimates informal employment to be about a quarter of total employment in Croatia 
in 1995. The largest part of informal employment, close to 40%, according to actual 
status in employment of those persons, consisted of unpaid family workers. Persons 
holding second (or multiple) jobs constitute another important form of informal 
employment, accounting for about a quarter of the total. 
 
As noted above, there are different sources of employment in the informal sector and 
different degrees of informality as well. The “core” of informal employment is to a 
large extent fueled by persons whose formal status differs from employment, such as 
students, unemployed persons or retired persons engaged in economic activities. 
During the early years of transition, many people officially left employment and went 
into inactivity, mostly by means of early retirement. Crnkovic-Pozaic (1998) 
estimates that 369 thousand people left activity over the 1990-1996 period
13. Many of 
those persons informally reentered employment as a socially insured group in an 
attempt to top-up their income. This is not so remarkable since early retirees on 
average aged 55. Retired persons constituted 6.5% of total employment according to 
ILO criteria and were one of the largest groups in the informal economy. Persons 
registered as unemployed constitute the second important source of informal 
employment, but their number has been falling recently. Share of these persons in 
total employment decreased from close to 4% in mid 1997 to a bit over 2% by the end 
of 2000. 
 
Several possible factors can account for the declining tendency of informal 
employment, despite worsening labor market situation until 2001. The first is that 
                                                                 
13 This figure is based on a Labor force survey conducted in 1996 and is therefore subject to a recall 
error. government institutions increased their efficiency and law enforcement as the 
immediate threat of war disappeared after 1995. Ott (2002) in a survey of unofficial 
economy in Croatia reports a number of different policy areas where significant 
progress was accomplished. The most important were tax reform, including the 
introduction of VAT in 1998, and drastic reduction of state arrears in 2000 that 
changed the image of the government with respect to payments. These changes were 
paralleled with the fall of attitudes towards opportunistic behavior also documented in 
Ott (2002) as the number of persons who think that tax evasion and bribe can never be 
justified has doubled between 1995 and 1999, indicating a rise in tax morality. 
Simultaneous change in the structure of spending to consumer durables (cars, flats) 
mainly bought with loans, stabilization of large retail systems and the introduction of 
foreign firms into the Croatian market also implied fewer opportunities for the work 
in unofficial economy and reinforced the effect of reforms and change in the attitudes. 
 
In addition to these factors, labor tax wedge was reduced from about 48% of total 
labor costs in 1995 to about 41% in 2001 (Rutkowski, 2003), which reduced the 
potential benefits of concealing economic activities. This reduction may not seem 
substantial, but it means that the amount of taxes and contributions paid on net wage 
were reduced by about a quarter - from 92% to 69% of net wage. To the extent that 
firing restrictions acted as a barrier for formalization of employee status, the growing 
share of temporary workers with short-term contract demonstrates how employers 
learned to exploit opportunities to enhance flexibility without violating the law. 
Finally and more recently, in early 2002 Croatian employment service introduced a 
number of so called "activation" measures designed to ensure that unemployed people 
are looking actively for work and to help them to do so. These measures facilitated 
identification and deletion from the unemployment register of those persons who did 
not fulfill new obligations due to engagement in informal activities. 
 
Table 11 Employed persons according to their formal status 

























share  73.8 8.6  4.7 0.8  1.6  0.5  4.2  2.8 1.5  1.4
Average  11.3 8.4  23.1 4.5  17.0  2.4  22.2  4.0 2.7  25.1tenure 
Hirings 
rate  13.4 10.1  2.0 38.5  5.9  61.7  3.4  37.1 42.7  3.8
Source: own calculations based on Labor Force Survey 2002 
 
Comparison of hiring rates in the formal and informal sector is one simple way to test 
whether informal employment was used to a large extent to promote flexibility. 
According to the “narrow” definition of informal employment, which excludes second 
job holders, but includes unpaid family workers as well as the formally unemployed 
and inactive (this category further collapses into retired persons, pupils and students 
and housewives) informal employment in 2002 declined to 12% of total employment 
(from over 19% of the total in 1995, according to Crnkovic-Pozaic, 1997). However, 
the share of hiring in informal sector in total hiring was 16.3%, which was not 
substantially higher than share of the informal sector in employment. Certain 
categories amongst informally employed exhibit higher job turnover, such as the 
unemployed, inactive and especially pupils and students, but hiring rates of those 
groups are again not substantially above those observed for workers engaged on 
formal job-specific contracts. 
 
Although informal employment in Croatia comprises of diverse groups and the 
narrow definition employed above focuses only on one portion of informal 
employment, notwithstanding individuals omitted by the labor force survey, above 
results suggest that formal and informal employment do not differ significantly along 
the dimension of flexibility. Therefore, the description of the informal employment as 
an adjustment buffer substituting for the lack of flexibility in the formal sector, 
according to the "dual labor market" hypothesis, is not an appropriate analytical tool 
to assess the relationship between formal and informal employment in Croatia. The 
dynamics of informal employment is rather more similar to flows in and out of the 
formal employment and therefore more likely to support the modeling approach of 
Boeri and Garibaldi (2002), according to which formal and informal employment 
enter the matching function in a complementary fashion. Moreover, Boeri and 
Garibaldi (2002) view informal employment as a joint decision by worker and firm. 
Evidence on job turnover in informal sector confirms that it is not only an inclination 
of employers to foster flexibility but also a supply side of the labor market that is 
relevant for the decision to seek informality. An attempt to top-up income arising from certain formal status, such as pensions or unemployment benefits, which would 
be lost in case of formal employment, with income from informal activities, acts as an 
important motivation for many persons engaged in informal activities. This means 
that if policymakers are determined to tackle the problem of informal employment in 
Croatia, they should also seek to monitor different groups of benefit recipients for 
participation in informal activities. 
 
The relationship between job and worker flows is another point of interest. The link 
between these two is of special interest because job turnover in market economies is 
an important determinant of the overall pace of worker reallocation, usually 
accounting for roughly 30 to 50 percent of worker turnover (OECD, 1997). In 
transition countries, an even larger portion of hiring and separation is driven by job 
destruction and job creation. This means that a major factor underlying worker 
mobility in transition countries is the changing allocation of jobs across businesses, as 
opposed to workers reallocating themselves for a given allocation of jobs across 
businesses (Haltiwanger, Lehmann and Terrell, 2003). Haltiwanger and Vodopivec 
(2000) report that in Estonia by 1993 job turnover comprised more than two-thirds of 
worker turnover (worker turnover rate exceeded 35% at that period of time). 
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003) find remarkably similar results for Slovenia 
during the late 1990’s as job turnover accounted for about two-thirds of worker 
turnover. 
 
According to reported findings, job flows in Croatia comprised about a third of 
worker turnover (calculated on a quarterly basis, better approximating true extent of 
worker turnover), which is in line with results from advanced market economies, but 
there are comparatively more workers churning between jobs in Croatia than in other 
transition countries. With respect to this finding, Croatia is more similar to a mature 
market economy, as there appears to be significant churning of workers between jobs. 
However, there is a possibility that regulation provides an important foundation for 
such a pattern of job and worker flows. The limited maximum duration of temporary 
contracts drastically increases churning at the short end of the tenure structure, 
notably among young workers entering employment in the new private sector. However, it has to be kept in mind that job and worker turnover data were constructed 






Both job and worker flows, which approximate the extent of external flexibility in 
labor input that is most likely to be affected by restrictive dismissal regulation, 
confirm a substantial degree of dynamism in the Croatian labor market. This is not 
unusual since some other countries considered to have low degree of labor market 
flexibility (such as Slovenia) also demonstrate that the link between regulation and 
flexibility is sometimes very weak. Data on average tenure in Croatia, on the other 
hand, indeed indicate a somewhat higher degree of job stability than among some 
other transition countries due to the large share of persons with exceptionally long 
tenures. However, if self-employed persons (many of them in agriculture) are 
excluded from the aggregate, average tenure seems substantially lower, in line with 
the most flexible transition economies. Therefore, it seems that data on job flows and 
worker flows do not distinguish Croatia from other transition countries, which goes 
against some previous evidence (e.g. Rutkowski, 2003). 
 
Although the overall degree of flexibility in Croatia is not especially low, it is 
confined to a small group of employees in the new private sector with a high chance 
for fluctuation between employment and unemployment. This lends support to the 
dualism hypothesis. While employment adjustment in state owned and privatized 
enterprises on average takes a long time, the new private sector takes a 
disproportionate burden of adjustment. Young workers recently entering employment 
are particularly prone to enter the cycle of excessively volatile employment. It is 
interesting to note that it is not the difference between formal and informal 
employment that is driving the wedge between the primary and the secondary tier of 
the labor market. Informal employment on average does not exhibit much higher 
turnover, and even the most dynamic groups amongst them do not surpass by far 
turnover rates of employees with formal contracts. 
                                                                 
14 There is also a possibility that significant bias is introduced into the job flow data by drawing the 
data only from continuing firms between the subsequent reporting periods.  
If the impact of EPL in Croatia is indeed mostly reflected in a different manner across 
sectors, it is unlikely that labor market reform will significantly increase overall 
flexibility or hinder informal employment. Less burdensome regulation is hence more 
likely to reduce large differences in job insecurity among workers in different sectors 
and facilitate labor market adjustment in state owned and privatized enterprises. 
 
There are several reasons to remain cautious with respect to the findings reported here 
and the expected outcomes of reform. First, since reform is the most pronounced in 
the area of regulations governing temporary contracts, reform may actually exacerbate 
the existing duality even more. As the whole area of research is still sketchy and the 
available datasets still hinder cross-country comparisons, labor economists have so far 
not been very successful in measuring the impact of regulation on labor market 
flexibility in transition countries. This is not so odd, because similar problems are still 
present even in studies of advanced economies. As different studies reveal 
contradictory results, it seems that only a few vague policy conclusions can be drawn 
with confidence from recent research on labor market flexibility in transition 
countries. 
 
Finally, it must be kept in mind that flexibility is not a single-dimensional variable. 
Although this paper looks at one dimension, which is most likely to be affected by 
regulation, in great detail, it does not attempt to give a comprehensive picture of labor 
market flexibility. It may be necessary to look at a battery of different indicators to 
asses the state of the labor market adequately. This is often hard to do in comparative 
studies. All this, of course, does not mean that labor market institutions and labor 
market flexibility are not important for overall labor market performance in transition 
countries. It simply means that the evidence we have is still scarce and more research 
on the dynamics of flows and their determinants has to be conducted to improve our 
knowledge of labor market adjustment.Main references: 
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Job flows 
Job creation equals employment gains summed over all business units that expanded 
during the year under observation. 
Job destruction is equal to employment losses summed over all business units that 
contracted during the year under observation. 
Job flows are usually expressed as a proportion of average employment at the 
beginning and at the end of the period under observation. Capturing job flows taking 
place within firms or establishments would be highly desirable, but very few studies 
manage to do this and it is virtually impossible to directly measure these flows using 
firm-level data. In principle, capturing job flows occurring in firms starting and 
closing during the period under observation would also be highly desirable, but since 
it is hard to distinguish between these events and non-reporting, such flows are 
usually omitted, as was done is this study. Omitting both within-firm flows and flows 
taking place in starting/closing firms biases job flow data downward. 
Net employment change equals the difference between job creation and job 
destruction. 
Job turnover equals the sum of the absolute value of all business units’ employment 
gains and losses, that is the sum of job creation and job destruction. 
Excess job reallocation is equal to the difference between job turnover and the 
absolute value of net employment change. It represents the part of job turnover that is 
above the amount required to accommodate net employment change. 
 
Worker flows 
The hiring rate is calculated as a sum of aggregate flows from unemployment to 
employment, from inactivity to employment and from one employment to another 
during the year under observation, divided by total employment at the beginning of 
the period. 
The separation rate is the sum of aggregate flows from employment to 
unemployment, from employment to inactivity and from one employment to another, 
divided by total employment at the beginning of the period (in both cases the average 
of the period to which Labor force survey refers was used because it is the most 
reliable estimate). Worker turnover is the sum of hiring and separation rates. 
Since rough data from the Labor force survey, which records only the last transition 
from one labor market state to another, was used to calculate worker flows, it is 
possible that the calculated rates understate the true turnover due to missed multiple 
transitions.  
 
While worker turnover refers to the movement of persons, job turnover encompasses 
only those movements that involve movement of jobs. Therefore, worker turnover 
encompasses labor turnover, but these two overlap only if separation is not followed 
by hiring, or vice versa. Also the coverage of the LFS is much wider than that of the 
FINA database, as LFS estimates employment to be about twice as much as 
enterprises report. The difference is due to sectors that do not report to FINA, such as 
government (public services, defense, the health and education sector) and 
unincorporated business (trades and crafts).  
 
Sources of definitions: Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), Rutkowski (2003) and Cazes 
and Nesporova (2003)Annex 2: Data description 
 
The data on job flows are extracted from the FINA (financial agency) database of 
enterprises’ annual reports. This database includes 85,995 enterprises that reported 
their financial statement at least once in two subsequent surveys during the 1993-2001 
period. Since submission of an annual report is a legal obligation for every enterprise 
operating in Croatia, FINA believes that the reporting enterprises account for the vast 
majority of operating enterprises. Only a negligible portion of enterprises decides not 
to report. The population for the calculation of job flow indicators in each single year 
includes between about 30 and 50 thousand enterprises reporting to subsequent 
surveys, depending on the actual year the survey was performed. 
 
Table 12 The number of continuing reporting enterprises 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
27,959  39,679  48,845  51,734  51,619  50,792  50,048  48,778 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
In order to provide consistency of data and clean most of the errors and omissions 
from the database, a visual inspection of enterprises exhibiting the largest 
employment fluctuations during any of the years under observation was performed. 
Elimination of unusually large employment swings among those enterprises on 
average reduced total job turnover by 2.4 percentage points or 15% of corrected job 
flows. 
 
The first Labor force survey in Croatia was conducted in 1996, while regular semi-
annual surveys, which are conducted to this day, commenced at the beginning of 
1998. The survey conducted in the first half of 2002, which is one of the last to 
become available, covered 8,095 households with a total of 22,592 persons who 
agreed to participate. The sample was constructed using a dual-stage stratified random 
sample procedure. The primary sampling units are segments that consist of one or 
more census districts formed for the needs of the last Population Census conducted in 
2001, and it was from these segments that the final secondary units, inhabited homes, 
were chosen (Državni zavod za statistiku, 2003). Annex 3: Data tables 
Job flows by regions (counties) 
Job creation  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Average 
Zagrebacka  7.0  8.8  10.9  11.4  8.9  9.7  10.4  13.4  10.1 
Krapinsko-Zagorska  5.6  3.5  4.3  8.8  6.0  5.9  6.4  9.9  6.3 
Sisacko-Moslavacka  4.7  4.0  7.6  8.3  9.9  9.2  9.7  6.4  7.5 
Karlovacka  7.0  6.7  5.7  5.5  6.9  6.6  8.1  11.1  7.2 
Varaždinska  3.5  2.1  8.6  7.4  7.3  8.2  8.5  8.4  6.7 
Koprivnicko-Križevacka  4.6  4.7  5.3  3.9  5.4  7.0  4.4  4.7  5.0 
Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska  4.6  5.0  4.8  5.5  9.7  4.3  7.5  7.4  6.1 
Primorsko-Goranska  6.2  4.4  6.9  6.8  7.9  8.1  9.1  9.8  7.4 
Licko-Senjska  4.0  4.3  4.3  6.7  6.9  9.7  6.6  6.3  6.1 
Viroviticko-Podravska  3.8  2.9  4.9  4.8  4.5  4.4  4.9  4.7  4.4 
Požeško-Slavonska  4.7  6.5  7.8  6.3  6.7  5.7  6.3  6.8  6.4 
Brodsko-Posavska  7.3  8.5  8.8  8.4  8.0  6.3  6.8  7.8  7.7 
Zadarska  8.3  8.1  8.3  9.5  9.0  6.7  10.7  8.7  8.7 
Osjecko-Baranjska  5.5  5.9  6.4  9.7  9.2  7.5  7.7  9.3  7.6 
Šibensko-Kninska  4.3  7.6  7.5  8.4  7.9  5.7  7.2  12.2  7.6 
Vukovarsko-Srijemska  9.4  8.1  9.5  13.6  17.2  10.0  9.7  11.2  11.1 
Splitsko-Dalmatinska  6.9  6.3  8.4  8.4  8.2  7.3  8.2  11.0  8.1 
Istarska  7.2  7.3  9.0  6.8  8.8  7.7  10.3  8.9  8.2 
Dubrovacko-Neretvanska  4.2  5.6  6.5  9.2  9.3  6.1  8.1  10.1  7.4 
Medimurska  7.4  5.8  5.6  7.9  7.0  5.5  7.7  10.6  7.2 
City of Zagreb  5.9  6.1  7.9  6.9  6.1  6.0  5.7  7.6  6.5 
average  5.9  5.9  7.5  7.5  7.4  6.8  7.3  8.7   
                   
Job destruction  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  average 
Zagrebacka  -9.6  -10.7  -10.2  -11.3  -9.4  -10.5  -12.8  -6.8  -10.1 
Krapinsko-Zagorska  -6.5  -7.6  -11.2  -13.7  -8.4  -7.6  -8.8  -6.6  -8.8 
Sisacko-Moslavacka  -8.2  -8.4  -7.8  -23.0  -11.0  -8.7  -6.4  -15.6  -11.1 
Karlovacka  -5.9  -7.4  -12.1  -11.0  -10.6  -13.5  -12.3  -9.0  -10.2 
Varaždinska  -10.2  -10.8  -12.2  -7.5  -6.1  -10.6  -7.1  -6.7  -8.9 
Koprivnicko-Križevacka  -4.5  -18.6  -6.6  -9.7  -9.4  -7.5  -7.7  -7.5  -8.9 
Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska  -10.0  -9.5  -16.4  -12.2  -7.6  -11.5  -8.6  -10.1  -10.8 
Primorsko-Goranska  -9.6  -11.9  -12.5  -9.1  -10.6  -10.4  -6.9  -6.6  -9.7 
Licko-Senjska  -9.7  -9.2  -9.3  -8.7  -13.5  -15.8  -6.9  -5.5  -9.8 
Viroviticko-Podravska  -12.6  -7.8  -7.6  -6.7  -7.7  -7.8  -17.5  -9.2  -9.6 
Požeško-Slavonska  -4.4  -12.7  -6.7  -9.0  -7.8  -13.2  -7.3  -5.6  -8.3 
Brodsko-Posavska  -10.2  -10.2  -11.8  -10.0  -7.2  -11.9  -12.3  -8.0  -10.2 
Zadarska  -13.5  -8.3  -10.5  -12.7  -6.9  -9.6  -6.8  -10.8  -9.9 
Osjecko-Baranjska  -9.6  -11.0  -20.1  -11.8  -7.3  -9.9  -11.3  -9.2  -11.3 
Šibensko-Kninska  -7.5  -6.3  -10.7  -14.0  -11.6  -9.1  -6.9  -7.3  -9.2 
Vukovarsko-Srijemska  -8.7  -17.0  -13.7  -10.5  -9.9  -16.4  -9.8  -6.9  -11.6 
Splitsko-Dalmatinska  -9.3  -11.9  -12.6  -12.8  -10.2  -9.3  -7.5  -7.7  -10.2 
Istarska  -13.8  -11.8  -11.0  -8.9  -8.0  -8.9  -10.1  -7.7  -10.0 
Dubrovacko-Neretvanska  -8.9  -12.3  -12.7  -12.3  -12.2  -11.9  -11.7  -10.4  -11.6 
Medimurska  -5.7  -11.3  -12.8  -5.8  -6.2  -7.8  -6.3  -4.9  -7.6 
City of Zagreb  -8.1  -6.2  -7.1  -8.3  -7.2  -7.8  -5.6  -7.0  -7.2 
average  -8.8  -9.2  -10.2  -9.9  -8.3  -9.3  -7.7  -7.6   
 Job flows – by ownership type 
Job creation  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  average 
Government owned                   
Communal etc.  1.3  1.7  2.9  2.9  1.7  1.9  1.6  1.2  1.9 
In privatization   3.3  1.3  2.5  4.0  3.5  5.0  3.0  3.5  3.3 
Privatization not started  3.0  1.7  4.0  3.6  5.7  3.7  1.8  3.1  3.3 
Mixed - majority st.  1.4  1.3  2.7  2.0  3.2  2.3  2.4  5.4  2.6 
Privately owned                   
De novo  31.4  23.5  23.8  20.0  17.8  14.9  14.3  16.7  20.3 
Privatized  2.8  2.3  2.8  2.4  2.7  2.6  4.1  4.3  3.0 
Cooperative  2.1  1.5  1.8  3.8  7.9  3.5  4.1  3.9  3.6 
Mixed – majority pr.  2.5  2.5  2.5  3.9  3.4  2.6  5.3  3.9  3.3 
Average  5.9  5.9  7.5  7.5  7.4  6.8  7.3  8.7   
                   
Job destruction  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  average 
Government owned                   
Communal etc.  -4.7  -1.6  -1.3  -3.9  -2.9  -2.7  -1.6  -2.7  -2.7 
In privatization   -9.5  -10.3  -12.8  -9.5  -12.1  -10.7  -21.4  -6.7  -11.6 
Privatization not started  -6.4  -13.5  -5.3  -8.3  -7.6  -8.7  -7.3  -3.6  -7.6 
Mixed - majority st.  -10.4  -12.4  -13.6  -16.6  -9.6  -8.0  -6.6  -10.3  -10.9 
Privately owned                   
De novo  -9.2  -11.5  -12.2  -9.7  -10.3  -12.1  -10.4  -8.4  -10.5 
Privatized  -9.8  -10.1  -9.8  -10.8  -8.8  -9.9  -8.6  -8.0  -9.5 
Cooperative  -9.5  -8.8  -15.4  -13.0  -15.9  -12.7  -13.0  -10.9  -12.4 
Mixed – majority pr.  -9.2  -8.7  -14.0  -10.1  -8.1  -9.1  -6.0  -9.6  -9.4 
Average  -8.8  -9.2  -10.2  -9.9  -8.3  -9.3  -7.7  -7.6   
                   
Employment structure  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001   
Government owned                   
Communal etc.      17.0         17.6         17.6         17.6         18.0         14.5         17.2         15.4      
In privatization         8.4           4.1           2.9           2.7           2.2           1.7           1.6           1.4      
Privatization not started        3.2           2.5           1.8           1.4           1.6           1.9           1.5           3.3      
Mixed - majority st.      21.6         19.7         17.5         14.3         12.1         11.7         11.0           7.3      
Privately owned                   
De novo      13.0         18.3         22.8         26.9         30.9         35.0         36.2         39.6      
Privatized      20.8         20.9         20.7         19.5         19.0         19.1         18.1         17.5      
Cooperative        1.6           0.9           0.7           0.6           0.6           0.5           0.5           0.4      
Mixed – majority pr.      14.4         16.0         16.0         17.0         15.6         15.6         14.0         15.0      
Total    100.0       100.0       100.0       100.0       100.0       100.0       100.0       100.0      
 Job flows – by firm size 
Job creation  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  average 
1-10  36.8  28.4  26.6  20.7  19.0  17.6  13.5  15.2  22.2 
11-20  25.5  19.8  19.9  18.5  17.1  13.5  14.1  15.9  18.0 
21-50  15.0  12.2  14.8  15.0  15.3  10.0  12.1  14.0  13.5 
51-200  5.4  4.0  5.4  6.7  6.1  6.3  7.9  9.7  6.4 
201-500  3.3  2.3  2.4  2.8  4.3  2.5  4.9  6.0  3.6 
501-  1.0  1.3  2.5  2.4  1.7  1.8  2.7  3.3  2.1 
average  5.9  5.9  7.5  7.5  7.4  6.8  7.3  8.7   
                   
Job destruction  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  average 
1-10  -9.9  -11.7  -12.6  -11.5  -11.6  -13.2  -11.7  -10.8  -11.6 
11-20  -12.4  -11.9  -13.3  -11.2  -10.6  -14.0  -12.0  -8.9  -11.8 
21-50  -12.8  -14.0  -15.8  -10.7  -11.9  -15.3  -11.2  -11.0  -12.8 
51-200  -12.0  -12.1  -12.2  -10.7  -9.2  -10.3  -9.8  -8.4  -10.6 
201-500  -9.0  -10.5  -9.4  -10.9  -8.6  -7.8  -5.5  -6.0  -8.5 
501-  -6.8  -6.2  -7.9  -8.3  -5.1  -4.9  -3.9  -5.2  -6.0 
average  -8.8  -9.2  -10.2  -9.9  -8.3  -9.3  -7.7  -7.6   
                   
Employment structure  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001   
1-10  6.9  9.9  12.6  14.0  14.8  16.1  16.1  16.1   
11-20  2.4  3.2  4.1  4.8  5.3  6.0  6.2  6.7   
21-50  4.5  5.5  6.4  7.3  8.3  8.9  8.8  9.3   
51-200  17.0  17.2  17.3  18.3  18.9  20.3  19.3  19.1   
201-500  20.7  19.9  18.5  17.0  16.5  16.6  14.7  15.0   
501-  48.5  44.4  41.1  38.6  36.2  32.1  34.9  33.9   
  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100   
 Job flows – by economic activities 
Job creation  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
01 - Agriculture, hunting and related service activities  4.3  3.8  5.6  6.2  3.7  7.4 
02 - Forestry, logging and related service activities  0.3  0.3  0.4  2.5  8.7  0.1 
05 - Fishing, aquaculture and service activities incidental to fishing  12.4  6.6  6.1  9.5  9.4  13.5 
10 - Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0   
11 - Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction    15.4  0.0  0.0  0.1  3.6 
13 - Mining of metal ores    0.0  27.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
14 - Other mining and quarrying  10.9  9.3  6.2  12.1  6.6  10.5 
15 - Manufacture of food products and beverages  3.1  4.5  5.3  3.2  4.3  5.2 
16 - Manufacture of tobacco products  1.5  1.6  0.0  0.0  3.8  2.7 
17 - Manufacture of textiles  2.7  6.2  4.6  1.9  4.5  6.6 
18 - Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur  3.7  3.9  3.4  3.9  6.2  6.5 
19 - Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear  3.9  5.7  2.5  7.7  4.8  6.1 
20 - Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture  7.8  7.6  10.0  8.0  8.7  7.5 
21 - Manufacture of paper and paper products  1.8  1.7  2.6  6.5  2.3  2.8 
22 - Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  9.4  5.7  6.4  5.7  4.2  8.6 
23 - Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.1  1.3  0.0 
24 - Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  2.2  0.6  0.8  1.2  1.1  1.2 
25 - Manufacture of rubber and plastics products  6.0  7.4  11.8  7.3  7.0  12.4 
26 - Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  3.1  3.9  3.2  4.5  4.4  5.3 
27 - Manufacture of basic metals  1.9  2.2  9.4  1.3  4.0  5.1 
28 - Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment  8.5  9.4  8.7  5.7  9.2  11.3 
29 - Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  5.6  4.4  3.4  4.7  5.0  6.3 
30 - Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery  23.0  22.0  26.4  31.7  34.7  7.0 
31 - Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  2.3  4.9  2.9  3.2  6.2  6.7 
32 - Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus  3.3  2.7  3.6  4.5  3.2  12.6 
33 - Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks  5.7  7.7  4.3  5.2  4.8  7.3 
34 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  3.9  2.3  7.5  0.8  1.5  28.7 
35 - Manufacture of other transport equipment  2.7  2.8  5.0  7.2  6.0  9.9 
36 - Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  4.2  3.8  3.9  5.4  11.1  5.1 
37 - Recycling  5.7  3.9  11.1  10.6  4.2  11.0 
40 - Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply  3.5  2.6  1.3  0.7  0.9  0.4 
41 - Collection, purification and distribution of water  6.1  4.4  3.8  2.6  1.6  2.1 
45 - Construction  13.9  10.7  10.1  7.4  7.0  10.7 50 - Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel  12.5  14.3  14.7  12.8  12.2  13.2 
51 - Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles  21.6  19.0  18.0  15.6  15.5  17.7 
52 - Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods  9.6  10.2  9.2  10.0  12.4  14.9 
55 - Hotels and restaurants  6.3  6.0  6.9  3.8  9.7  8.5 
60 - Land transport; transport via pipelines  3.3  4.5  2.7  2.2  1.9  2.7 
61 - Water transport  0.8  2.4  1.1  0.8  1.5  1.8 
62 - Air transport  12.0  20.1  4.7  3.3  2.5  10.4 
63 - Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies  7.4  6.2  4.6  5.0  5.4  7.7 
64 - Post and telecommunications  4.5  4.9  3.4  119.6  1.7  2.0 
65 - Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding  16.9  33.7  22.2  27.9  9.3  14.2 
66 - Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security    200.0  0.0  66.7  0.0  44.4 
67 - Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation  24.5  17.5  15.7  15.7  13.7  12.9 
70 - Real estate activities  3.7  6.9  9.6  8.9  7.3  7.8 
71 - Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods  17.1  17.2  37.5  17.4  19.5  20.0 
72 - Computer and related activities  18.5  16.6  13.7  12.6  10.5  11.7 
73 - Research and development  5.8  2.8  4.2  2.6  12.9  3.6 
74 - Other business activities  15.1  16.2  16.1  12.3  10.1  12.9 
80 - Education  12.0  12.8  13.5  10.1  13.4  11.2 
85 - Health and social work  8.3  9.2  15.4  7.0  8.5  10.8 
90 - Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities  3.4  5.2  3.0  4.9  2.9  6.2 
91 - Activities of membership organizations n.e.c.  10.6  4.2  1.5  11.8  17.6  6.1 
92 - Recreational, cultural and sporting activities  11.8  7.6  7.5  7.1  7.2  8.2 
93 - Other service activities  5.4  6.0  6.5  5.3  7.2  12.1 
 
Job destruction   1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
01 - Agriculture, hunting and related service activities  -23.2  -13.9  -7.1  -12.2  -16.2  -7.5 
02 - Forestry, logging and related service activities  -1.4  -9.0  -1.4  -0.7  -0.5  -6.3 
05 - Fishing, aquaculture and service activities incidental to fishing  -13.8  -10.1  -12.3  -11.1  -10.6  -7.9 
10 - Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat  -12.2  -10.1  -33.1  -134.6  -200.0   
11 - Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction    0.0  -3.8  -3.6  -9.3  0.0 
13 - Mining of metal ores    -45.5  0.0  -43.6  -9.8  0.0 
14 - Other mining and quarrying  -3.2  -5.5  -3.4  -4.2  -5.2  -3.6 
15 - Manufacture of food products and beverages  -8.3  -8.0  -5.8  -8.0  -4.4  -4.7 
16 - Manufacture of tobacco products  -4.4  -6.5  -15.0  -24.2  -11.4  -1.1 
17 - Manufacture of textiles  -12.2  -22.7  -7.9  -8.9  -8.8  -16.7 18 - Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur  -13.0  -14.8  -10.2  -5.9  -8.5  -5.9 
19 - Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear  -7.8  -10.3  -10.1  -8.1  -11.1  -16.3 
20 - Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture;  -11.3  -10.5  -7.7  -10.8  -9.2  -10.3 
21 - Manufacture of paper and paper products  -12.1  -20.9  -7.3  -7.3  -3.8  -2.9 
22 - Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  -7.8  -8.0  -11.7  -10.3  -9.6  -6.4 
23 - Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  -2.1  -20.5  -6.0  0.0  0.0  -1.3 
24 - Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  -4.6  -7.8  -7.7  -5.2  -8.0  -9.8 
25 - Manufacture of rubber and plastics products  -9.3  -12.6  -7.3  -9.2  -9.1  -9.3 
26 - Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  -12.1  -7.7  -10.2  -8.0  -7.9  -5.4 
27 - Manufacture of basic metals  -10.5  -38.4  -8.2  -7.7  -8.2  -12.3 
28 - Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment  -12.7  -11.4  -10.7  -14.4  -11.4  -6.4 
29 - Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  -15.4  -11.0  -9.8  -8.9  -7.4  -10.2 
30 - Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery  -7.1  -7.3  -7.8  -7.8  -3.9  -44.9 
31 - Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  -10.9  -12.6  -10.3  -11.3  -3.0  -4.8 
32 - Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus  -6.8  -7.9  -15.2  -20.2  -10.8  -9.1 
33 - Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks  -9.9  -11.5  -13.0  -10.7  -10.0  -3.9 
34 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  -6.5  -2.8  -12.8  -8.4  -32.1  -7.6 
35 - Manufacture of other transport equipment  -7.5  -8.8  -3.3  -4.2  -6.1  -3.0 
36 - Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  -14.8  -7.6  -10.3  -10.9  -13.3  -9.7 
37 - Recycling  -16.2  -14.7  -6.0  -8.1  -6.3  -4.1 
40 - Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply  -0.3  -0.3  -0.6  -0.6  -0.1  -1.4 
41 - Collection, purification and distribution of water  -1.2  -0.8  -2.4  -1.1  -2.5  -1.9 
45 - Construction  -13.2  -10.3  -8.6  -12.9  -12.2  -13.0 
50 - Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel  -12.4  -17.4  -11.3  -11.5  -9.9  -7.7 
51 - Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles  -14.3  -11.3  -10.8  -11.5  -9.9  -9.1 
52 - Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods  -16.1  -11.7  -10.6  -12.0  -9.6  -11.9 
55 - Hotels and restaurants  -11.3  -10.2  -10.1  -12.5  -6.0  -6.1 
60 - Land transport; transport via pipelines  -2.7  -3.2  -7.0  -7.0  -5.2  -5.0 
61 - Water transport  -2.6  -2.7  -4.8  -7.4  -5.0  -6.6 
62 - Air transport  0.0  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.4 
63 - Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies  -6.4  -7.0  -11.9  -8.0  -5.8  -4.5 
64 - Post and telecommunications  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.5  -0.0  -1.3 
65 - Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding  -6.8  -7.8  -12.7  -24.0  -21.3  -13.6 
66 - Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security    0.0  0.0  0.0  -54.5  -22.2 
67 - Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation  -9.6  -8.1  -7.9  -9.8  -12.0  -8.2 
70 - Real estate activities  -3.1  -1.7  -4.1  -2.5  -3.6  -12.2 71 - Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods  -13.6  -22.6  -8.6  -8.2  -7.7  -12.5 
72 - Computer and related activities  -10.8  -7.0  -9.6  -10.0  -8.2  -7.9 
73 - Research and development  -8.7  -5.6  -4.8  -7.0  -6.0  -4.8 
74 - Other business activities  -11.1  -8.7  -11.8  -12.2  -9.1  -7.5 
80 - Education  -5.9  -4.6  -7.5  -11.9  -8.7  -10.6 
85 - Health and social work  -6.1  -3.1  -9.4  -11.7  -4.3  -7.2 
90 - Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities  -0.9  -2.4  -2.0  -3.5  -1.9  -1.1 
91 - Activities of membership organizations n.e.c.  -5.3  -1.4  -4.5  -2.9  -5.9  -1.5 
92 - Recreational, cultural and sporting activities  -5.4  -3.9  -3.4  -4.4  -2.2  -2.5 
93 - Other service activities  -6.8  -6.3  -6.9  -6.7  -6.4  -8.8 
 